Multipath communications at the Internet scale have been a myth for a long time, with no actual protocol being deployed so that multiple paths could be taken by a same connection on the way towards an Internet destination. Recently, the Multipath Transmission Control Protocol (MPTCP) extension has been standardized and is undergoing rapid adoption in many different use-cases, from mobile to fixed access networks, from data-centers to core networks. Among its major benefits -- i.e., reliability thanks to backup path rerouting, throughput increase thanks to link aggregation, and confidentiality being more difficult to intercept a full connection -- the latter has attracted lower attention. How effective would be to use MPTCP to exploit multiple Internet-scale paths and decrease the probability of Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks is a question which we try to answer. By analyzing the Autonomous System (AS) level graph, we identify which countries and regions show a higher level of robustness against MITM AS-level attacks, for example due to core cable tapping or route hijacking practices.
Stefano Secci is an Associate Professor at the Universite Pierre et Marie Curie (UPMC - Paris VI - Sorbonne Universites), Paris, France, conducting research within the PHARE group, Networks and Systems department, CNRS LIP6. He received the M.Sc. degree in communications engineering from Politecnico di Milano, Milan, Italy, in 2005, and a dual Ph.D. degree in computer science and networks from Politecnico di Milano (Networks group) and Telecom ParisTech (NMS group), France, in 2009. In 2010, he worked as Post-Doctoral Fellow with NTNU (Q2S), Norway, and George Mason University (CNL), USA. Before the Ph.D., in 2005-2006, he worked as a Research Associate with Ecole Polytechnique de Montreal (GERAD), Canada, and with Politecnico di Milano, and as a Network Engineer with Fastweb Italia, Italy. Dr Secci is IEEE Senior member.